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ABANDONING CORPORATE ONTOLOGY: ORIGINAL ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATION
Owen Alderson*
INTRODUCTION
The economic principles underlying the Constitution are not readily
apparent from a cursory reading of the text. As Charles Beard notes, the
Constitution “places no property qualifications on voters or officers; it gives
no outward recognition of any economic groups in society”; and “it mentions
no special privileges conferred upon any class.”1 It delegates Congress’s
power to regulate economic activity through, for instance, interstate
commerce2 and taxation,3 but makes little mention of express grants of
economic rights to individuals.
Despite the written Constitution’s omission of economic rights,
Americans have enjoyed constitutional protections in forwarding their
economic interests, including in forming and operating business
corporations.4 Since corporations gained standing to defend their interests
in an Article III court in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,5 they have won a
number of constitutional rights previously believed to only apply to natural
persons.6 Although the academic and jurisprudential debate on the
interpretation of corporate rights has ebbed and flowed, the interpretive
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gymnastics needed to square these rights with the Constitution’s original text
and history have been consistently derided by scholars across the ideological
spectrum. Most recently, the debate has been reignited by the Court’s
decision in Citizens United—which provided corporations with a
constitutionally protected right to political speech under the First
Amendment7—a decision which has been repeatedly criticized as an
abrogation of sound interpretive principles.8
The convoluted and polarizing history of corporate constitutional rights
begs important questions. Which interpretive tools justify the delegation of
constitutional protections to business corporations, when the original text
and history of the document present such scant guidance? Can the
Constitution’s limited discussion of economic rights allow us to definitively
declare what the law is regarding the rights of business corporations? Under
what circumstances do we consider a business corporation to be a “person”
or “citizen” deserving constitutional protection?
So far, these questions have largely been answered through competing
theories of corporate ontology: theories of the nature of a business
corporation and the relationship between its constituent parts. The history
of the debate shows a struggle between two dominant camps of thought—
the aggregate theory and the real entity theory—which offer competing
accounts of what a corporation is, and therefore, which constitutional rights
they ought to be assigned.9
This Comment argues that focusing solely on competing theories of
corporate ontology is an inadequate method of interpreting the
constitutional protections applicable to business corporations. It then
provides an exploration of other means of elucidating corporate rights using
the Constitution’s text and history pertaining to economic rights. In
particular, it looks at the Constitution’s treatment of property and contracts
to ascertain a new perspective on the rights of business corporations, and the
people who form them.
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Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).
For a discussion of the reaction to Citizens United, see infra Part II.B.
A third theory worth mentioning is the concession theory, in which the corporation is a legal fiction
“created and empowered as a ‘concession’ from the state political authority.” See Eric W. Orts,
Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 68 (1992)
(noting the conflicts between concession theory and other theories of corporations). However, as
Elizabeth Pollman notes, though popular in the early 19th century, the theory lost relevancy once
incorporation shifted from a special privilege granted by the state to a legislative formality. See
Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1661–62 (2011)
(“[T]he description of corporations as a concession from a particular state seems a poor fit in our
modern, global environment”). As a result, it has largely fallen out of favor in the contemporary
debate.
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Part I.A provides a condensed overview of the historical debate between
competing corporate ontology theories. Part I.B discusses the critical
response to Citizens United, surveying the critiques employing corporate
ontology and those which seek alternative frameworks. Part II argues that
competing theories of corporate ontology have been a largely inadequate
framework for discerning whether or not business corporations enjoy a
certain constitutional protection, due to their inconsistent application and
tenuous relationship with the text and history of the Constitution. Part III.A
explores the Constitution’s structural treatment of economic rights to derive
a constitutional principle of economic liberty, which serves as an alternative
tool for evaluating corporate rights. Part III.B then applies that principle to
arrive at two prescriptive conclusions concerning the interpretation of
corporate rights. First, because the Constitution values one’s ability to
contract and obtain property without unjust impairment by the government,
courts should not distinguish between the ontology of different
contract/property arrangements. Second, business corporations ought to be
granted a constitutional protection otherwise attributable to natural persons
only if it serves the constitutional provision’s function of enhancing economic
liberty. In other words, the protection must enhance the corporation’s free
agency to obtain and hold property and enter into its optimal contractual
arrangements.
For the purposes of this Comment, I will only be discussing the rights of
for-profit business corporations. Comparing the rights of for-profit
corporations relative to non-corporate business entities, or to nonprofit
advocacy groups, is beyond the scope of this Comment. Although my
analysis includes important landmark decisions concerning nonprofit
corporations and membership associations, the discussion of these cases
serves only to parse their subsequent impact on the constitutional rights of
for-profit business corporations.
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I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE CORPORATE
ONTOLOGY DEBATE
A. An Abbreviated History of Dueling Ontological Theories
The Constitution makes no mention of the word “corporation,”
“business entity,” or any other synonym.10 At the time of the first corporate
constitutional rights cases, the typical corporation was wholly different than
the modern corporation. Corporate charters were only granted by the state
for the performance of specific public purpose, such as building bridges,
digging canals, and establishing trade and transportation routes.11 The
corporation was regulated solely through its charter, which outlined both the
special privileges granted to the corporation and the limitations on its
operations.12 The concept of protecting these enterprises through the
Constitution was thus a novel one, since corporations were not only scarce,13
but also considered “quasi-public” arms of the state.14
Nevertheless, the Marshall Court’s approach to the first corporate
constitutional rights cases sidestepped the quasi-public nature of the early
corporation, adopting a prototypical version of what would later be referred
to as the aggregate theory of corporate personhood. In Bank of the United States
v. Deveaux,15 the earliest corporate constitutional rights case to reach the
Supreme Court, the Marshall Court held that corporations are “citizens” for
the purpose of Article III standing.16 Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that,
because the natural people composing the corporation—the “real parties” in
the case—were “citizens” for the purposes of Article III, their citizenship
ought to allow them to sue in their collective corporate name.17
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JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1780–1970 , at 113 (1970).
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 72–73 (1992) (discussing the reconceptualization of the corporation in the
late nineteenth century).
See HURST, supra note 10, at 45–47, 157 (noting the fear of corporate ambition that led to limits
imposed through the corporate charter).
See WARREN J. SAMUELS & ARTHUR S. MILLER, CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND
RESPONSIBILITY 2 (1987) (“Only approximately 300 corporations, each comparatively small in
size, were present as late as 1800”); see also Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origin of the American
Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 4 (1945).
Margaret M. Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth
Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 428 (2003).
Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61 (1809).
Id. at 91.
Id.
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Ten years later, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Marshall Court ruled
that corporations were private entities whose charter was a binding contract
between the state and the natural persons who formed the corporation.18
This contract was thus protected by the contracts clause in the same way that
any other private contract would be protected, and was thus rendered by the
Court to be unalterable by the New Hampshire state legislature.19 Both
Deveaux and Dartmouth College opted to pierce the corporate veil,20 disregarding
the corporate form to allow corporations to exercise the same rights as its
members. For Marshall, the corporate form was an “invisible, intangible,
artificial” being that the Court should bypass in order to focus on the
individual members of the enterprise.21
As the Marshall Court became the Taney Court, a wave of populist
reformers sought to make the corporate form available to more business
owners, rather than a small handful of elites for whom the state granted
special privileges.22 But as the corporate form became more democratized,
the Taney Court simultaneously rejected the Marshallian view that
corporate rights ought to be determined through veil piercing to reach
corporate participants. In the Charles River Bridge case23 and in Bank of Augusta
v. Earle,24 the Supreme Court rejected veil-piercing in favor of an approach
that limited a corporation’s ability to seek constitutional protection. To the
Taney Court, “whenever a corporation makes a contract, it is the contract
of the legal entity—of the artificial being created by the charter—and not the
contract of the individual members.”25 Whereas citizens of foreign states
could do business anywhere under the comity clause of Article IV,
corporations were distinct and separate entities from their members and
could not claim such protection.26
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Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 691 (1819).
Id.
This Comment adopts “piercing the corporate veil” as used by Winkler to describe the process of
looking past the corporate form to reach the individuals comprising the corporation. See WINKLER,
supra note 4, at 66.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 73.
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1634
(1988) (discussing the Jackson-era critiques of special privilege incorporation and subsequent
reforms); WINKLER, supra note 4, at 92 (describing the introduction of “general incorporation” laws
during the Jacksonian period).
Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420
(1837).
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587 (1839).
Id.
WINKLER, supra note 4, at 101
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Furthermore, the Earle decision rejected the bank’s argument that, if
corporations were “citizens” for the purposes of the Article III standing postDeveaux, they ought to be “citizens” under Article IV comity.27 The Taney
Court would further restrict corporations’ claims to “citizenship” for the
purposes of Article III standing, again on the basis that the corporation was
a separate legal entity from its individual members.28 The Taney Court
therefore forwarded the idea that corporations were separate and distinct
entities afforded less protection than natural persons. However, the Court
did so in a way that unmoored the doctrine of corporate constitutional rights
from any form of consistent application of the text and its original meaning.
It merely set corporations apart as separate legal entities, with little guidance
on exactly how and when constitutional personhood applied differently to
corporations.
Reconstruction and the Gilded Age saw a revival of the aggregate theory
in Supreme Court jurisprudence, this time in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Most notably, in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, Justice Field’s
opinion held a railroad corporation to be a “person” for the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, entitling a corporation’s property to the same equal
protection rights as individual stockholders.29 Although the Supreme Court
originally avoided the question of whether the railroad corporation was a
“person” for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court reporter ended up stating that the justices were in agreement that they
were.30
Two years later, the Court would reaffirm the Santa Clara “holding” in
Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, ruling that
“corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special
purpose . . . . The equal protection of the laws which these bodies may claim
is only such as is accorded to similar associations within the jurisdiction of
the State.”31 Not only did the Court articulate the view that a corporation
was a mere association of individuals with identical interests to those
constitutive individuals, but also that corporations should receive
constitutional protection of shareholder property rights equal to the

27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 100.
Id. at 103.
Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
Id.
Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888); see also
St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 33 (1889) (holding that the Fourteenth amendment
applied to protect railroad companies).
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protection given to unincorporated businesses or persons, such as sole
proprietorships and partnerships.32 As Winkler notes, calling corporations
“persons” was the textual hook for affording Fourteenth Amendment
protection. However, this was not to say that they had rights in and of
themselves; their rights were an instrument to protect the property rights of
shareholders.33
The Lochner Court, however, refused to pierce the corporate veil to extend
the aggregate theory beyond deprivation of property under the Fourteenth
Amendment, forming a split between property rights and liberty rights. This
split would play out in the Court’s handling of the corporate criminal
defendant. In Hale v. Henkel, the Court held that corporations were protected
by the Fourth Amendment’s limit on unreasonable searches and seizures, but
not the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause.34 Although, at one
point, Justice Brown refers to corporations as “associations of people,”35 his
opinion relies on the view that the corporate form is a distinct legal actor,
separate from its members (in this case, the company’s employees).36
Whereas individuals owe “no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge
his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to
incriminate him,” corporations are not protected by the same rationale.37
The Court remained consistent with the property/liberty dichotomy
found in previous Lochner Era cases. Whereas the Fourth Amendment was
inherently a protection of property, and thus appropriately attributable to
the corporation, the Fifth Amendment was one of personal liberty that the
Court would not extend.38 Their explanation sought to justify why
corporations were considered “persons” for the Fourth Amendment but not
the Fifth, but in the end only served to confuse the debate further. With Hale
still on the books, its treatment of the Fifth Amendment remains an outlier
of its time in its rejection of veil piercing and embrace of the real entity
theory.
32
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See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV.
173, 174 (1985). See also Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 1645.
WINKLER, supra note 4, at 159–60; see also Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative
Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1695 (2015) (describing the
Fourteenth Amendment protections afforded to corporations during this period as “derivative”
rights, in that they “derived from the rights of natural persons behind the corporation”).
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69–70, 73 (1906).
Id. at 76.
WINKLER, supra note 4, at 187.
Hale, 201 U.S. at 74.
See Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations,163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 129 (2014).
(discussing the liberty/property distinction).
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The Lochner Court explicitly would not pierce the veil in order to grant
rights considered to be liberty rights, rather than property rights.39 However,
changes in the makeup of the Court during the Great Depression ushered in
an expansion of liberty rights in two key areas—association and speech—
that paralleled the contemporaneous expansion of civil rights. In NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Paterson, the Court held that members of a nonprofit
membership corporation were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against state-compelled disclosure of the group’s membership list, which
restrains the members’ freedom of association.40 The Court based their
decision to pierce the veil on the fact that the NAACP was not a business
corporation, and instead a voluntary association of members using the
corporate form to advocate for their political ends.41 There was a unique
“nexus” between the corporation that made the two “in every practical sense
identical.”42 Although the Court adopted the aggregate theory due to the
NAACP’s nonprofit, voluntary membership form of organization, the Court
noted that it was “immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by
association pertain to political, economic, religious, or cultural matters”
when deciding whether a given state action curtailing the freedom to
associate is subject to strict scrutiny.43
The broad language of Patterson gave enough leeway for the expansion of
corporate speech rights for business corporations using the aggregate theory
in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti and Citizens United. In Bellotti, the Court
rejected the argument that the First Amendment rights of a corporation
derive purely from their business and property interests.44 Instead of the kind
of veil piercing seen in Santa Clara, Bellotti’s conception of corporate speech
rights rested on the rights of the public to inform themselves, casting off the
“identity of its source, whether a corporation, association, union, or
individual” as irrelevant.45 Rather than explicitly calling corporations
“associations of people,” the Court suggested that the same treatment ought
to apply for a corporation as to individuals, including the individuals
39
40
41

42
43
44
45

See, e.g., W. Turf Ass’n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907) (holding that corporations do not
have a right to freedom of association).
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
See id. (“We hold that the immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists which the Association
claims on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of the members to pursue their lawful
private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing as to come within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
Id. at 458–59.
Id. at 460–61.
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783–84 (1978).
Id. at 777.
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comprising the corporation and the individuals who would be informed by
the corporation’s “speech.”
The Court later followed the same strategy in Citizens United to strike
down the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s restrictions on corporate
spending as violative of First Amendment speech rights, overturning two
previous cases (McConnell46 and Austin47) and expanding corporate First
Amendment rights to allow corporations to spend unlimited amounts of
money on any kind of election.48 Unlike in Bellotti, however, Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion largely hinges on an explicitly aggregate view of
the corporation. “If the First Amendment has any force,” Kennedy
reasoned, “it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations
of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech.”49 Restricting corporate
spending (speech) was therefore a persecution against the “association of
citizens” that comprised the corporation and “the right of citizens to inquire,
to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition
to enlightened self- government and a necessary means to protect it.”50
B. Modern Responses to Corporate Ontology: Doubling Down and Exploring
Alternatives
Citizens United was met with, and still garners, harsh criticism. Many of
the most prominent objections to the decision chose the aggregate theory of
corporate personality as their main point of contention. Throughout his
dissent, Justice Stevens railed against the majority’s theory of the
corporation, arguing for a strict dichotomy between natural individuals and

46
47
48
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McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 460 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 349 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). Although the corporation involved in Citizens United
was a nonprofit, Justice Kennedy refused to confine his decision to nonprofits, despite the Solicitor
General’s invitation to limit the decision to nonprofits that are “funded overwhelmingly by
individuals.” Id. at 327–29. Instead, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the same First Amendment
protections must be afforded to for-profit corporations as nonprofit corporations. See id. at 365 (“No
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit
corporations.”).
Id. at 339.
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corporations.51 Responding to dismal polling of the decision’s popularity,52
political figures from across the ideological spectrum derided the opinion as
a symptom of pervasive corporate influence in elections, using the opinion as
a rallying cry for campaign finance reform measures. There was even a
proposed constitutional amendment to codify the real entity theory,
definitively separating corporations from natural persons.53
As for the academic debate, numerous constitutional and corporate law
scholars have criticized Citizens United by arguing that the Court’s decision is
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the corporation.54
Notably, Chief Justice Leo Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court (along
with two co-authors) has written a trio of articles attacking Citizens United in
which he argues that the case not only misconceived the nature of the
corporation, but was also irreconcilable with the originalist doctrines
espoused by many of the conservative justices signing onto the majority
opinion.55 These critiques echo those levelled at the aggregate theory since
the height of the Taney Court, calling for a real-entity interpretation in order
to limit corporate constitutional rights and reduce the outsized influence of
corporate special interests.56
51

52

53
54

55

56

See, e.g., id. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing corporations and natural human speakers
in the context of public office elections); id. at 423–24, (discussing the disparate ramifications of
limiting corporate spending on elections as opposed to individual spending); id. at 428 (arguing that
the Framers “had little trouble distinguishing corporations from human beings, and when they
constitutionalized the right to free speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of
individual Americans that they had in mind”).
See Ashley Balcerzak, Study: Most Americans Want to Kill ‘Citizens United’ with Constitutional Amendment,
PUB. RADIO INT’L (May 10, 2018, 11:45 AM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-05-10/studymost-americans-want-kill-citizens-united-constitutional-amendment.
We the People, Not We the Corporations, MOVETOAMEND (Jan. 6, 2018), https://movetoam
end.org/we-people-not-we-corporations-2.
This Comment will not exhaust the scholarly objections to the decision here, but for a particularly
biting critique, see, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” Decision, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 25,
2010, at 65 (asserting that Citizens United is wrong on the basis that corporations should not be
afforded First Amendment protections).
See generally, Leo E. Strine Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between
Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (2015); Leo E.
Strine Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with
Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877 (2016); Leo E. Strine Jr. & Jonathan Macey,
Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 451 (2019). For an alternative discussion
on Citizens United’s irreconcilability with originalism, see also Ian Speir, Corporations, the Original
Understanding, and the Problem of Power, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115 (2012); Amanda D. Johnson,
Originalism and Citizens United: The Struggle of Corporate Personhood, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 187 (2010).
Chief Justice Strine is not the only scholar to question Citizens United using corporate ontology
theory. See generally Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327 (2014)
(arguing that the concession theory of corporate ontology ought to play a more prominent role in
the corporate-constitutional debate).
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Others have shied away from employing corporate ontology in criticizing
Citizens United, and corporate rights more broadly, and have suggested
alternative frameworks. For example, Elizabeth Pollman has suggested a
framework that looks to the “purpose of the constitutional right at issue, and
whether it would promote the objectives of that right to provide it to the
corporation.”57 A similarly functionalist approach is forwarded by Jess
Krannich, who argues for an abandonment of corporate ontology in favor of
an approach that examines “the values and policies underlying each
constitutional right.”58 Brandon Garrett recognizes the inconsistencies of the
Supreme Court’s approach and instead argues that the rights of business
corporations ought to be framed in terms of organizational standing doctrine
under Article III.59 These alternative frameworks provide valuable
contributions to a reframing of corporate constitutional rights. However,
these accounts do not resolve the central question posed by Strine: when, if
at all, does granting corporations constitutional rights comport with
originalist principles? They are thus not likely to satisfy those seeking an
approach that is rooted in the text and history of the Constitution.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH CORPORATE ONTOLOGY
From the precarious evolution of corporate rights doctrine, it is no
surprise that competing theories of corporate ontology continue to stoke
debate. In fact, it is the method’s very malleability that makes it prone to
controversy. As evidenced in the cases described above, the Court has failed
to apply a consistent framework when it comes to deciphering the nature of
the corporation.
This is not necessarily the Court’s fault. The corporate form has
undergone significant changes since Deveaux. With the introduction of:
limited liability; broader federal and state regulation; increased political and
social power; and the growing separation between passive investors and
active management,60 the relationship between shareholders, the
corporation, and the state has shifted drastically. The growing complexity of

57
58
59
60

See Pollman, supra note 9, at 1631.
Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional
Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 64 (2005).
Garrett, supra note 38, at 101–02.
This is what Berle and Means refer to as the “separation of ownership and control.” See generally
ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
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the corporate form inevitably allows for multiple conceptions of the
corporation that are facially correct, or at least defensible.
However, as Pollman argues, “oscillating between these conceptions
demonstrates the weakness of this approach,”61 and creates vulnerabilities for
exploitation. The Supreme Court’s ad hoc approach can be seen less as
indecisiveness on corporate ontology, but rather the opportunistic use of
one’s preferred theory to achieve the desired ends in the case.
This legal realist view was forcefully advanced by John Dewey in his
influential article, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality.62 Dewey
argues that the debates over the attributes of a “person” were wrongly
imported into the legal discussion.63 As a result, “[e]ach theory has been
used to serve the same ends, and each has been used to serve opposing
ends.”64 Dewey’s critique is an effective one, especially post-Citizens United,
as both the aggregate theory and the real entity theory have been used to
forward other interests.65 For example, Justice Taney’s use of the real entity
theory can arguably be seen as an instrument to pursue preference for states’
rights and a disdain for special corporate privileges that inhibited free market
competition, as opposed to neutral use of a theory rooted in constitutional
best practices. Santa Clara could be seen as an example of using the
associational theory for similar jurisprudential sins. Some commentators
have suggested the case represents a concerted effort to frame corporations
as associations of “people” in order to hide their underlying political and
economic agenda.66 Without a guiding, underlying principle rooted in the
Constitution’s text and history, the Court is seemingly incentivized to supply
their own in justifying their interpretive rules of corporate ontology.
61
62
63
64
65

66

See Pollman, supra note 9, at 1630.
John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926).
Id. at 658.
Id. at 669.
See Blair & Pollman, supra note 33, at 1731 (“The Court has extended constitutional protections to
corporations when it is a necessary or convenient way to protect the rights of the natural persons
assumed to be represented by the corporation in question, at least with respect to the issue at
stake.”).
See generally Howard Jay Graham, The “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J.
371 (1938) (arguing that Justice Field saw the function of Fourteenth Amendment personhood status
for corporations as a means for implementing a laissez-faire economic policy for business interests
and establishing constitutional rights of property on an almost absolutist basis). A similar criticism
has been leveled against the Citizens United decision as framing corporate speech rights as protecting
both the members and the public in order to advance a corporatist agenda. See generally Dworkin,
supra note 54 (arguing that Citizens United “displays the five justices’ instinctive favoritism of
corporate interests,” and blasting the use of veil piercing to treat corporations like “real people” as
“preposterous”).
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Ad hoc rationalizations using theories of corporate ontology also invert
the ideal relationship between the original meaning of the Constitution’s text
and constitutional rules that are derived from them—namely, that the
original meaning of the text ought to constrain constitutional actors in
crafting constitutional rules.67 Proponents of the aggregate and real entity
theories alike are guilty of trying to fit a square peg into a round textualist
hole, so to speak.
Take the Fourteenth Amendment, for instance, prohibiting state action
from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law,” or denying “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”68 Conceptualizing the corporation as an association of natural
persons for the purposes of grounding a given rule in the text may help
rationalize why individual members ought to be entitled to a given
Fourteenth Amendment protection, as those individuals are well within the
original meaning of “person.” However, it largely ignores the diversity of
forms that the corporation takes, and the unique relationships between
individual members and the corporate form. It also fails to provide a cogent
approach for discerning which “people” or “citizens” constitute the
association.69 Most importantly, it offers no rationalization for why a
corporate association—as its own entity, litigating in its own name—should
be granted rights derivatively from their members. As Blair and Pollman
argue, this would require a detailed inquiry into whether or not a given
corporation can be viewed as an aggregate of its members.70 Calling
corporations associations of natural “persons” and then pointing to the text
as conclusive in supporting the grant of a given right thus fails to do the actual
work of connecting the text to a conclusive rule.
On the other hand, those who criticize the Court’s approach to corporate
rights under the real entity theory employ a similarly reductive analysis of the
text. To real entity theorists, the equation is simple. The Fourteenth
67

68
69

70

This statement asserts a version of the “constraint principles,” thought to be one of two defining
characteristics of originalist constitutional interpretation, as defined by Lawrence Solum. See
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 456 (2013).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The “people” that the Court has sought to protect most often are shareholders. Chief Justice Strine
and Macey have refuted this theory by arguing that shareholders are not empirical owners of the
corporation, but rather owners of “investment interests” whose relationship to the firm is “purely
statutory and contractual.” See Strine & Macey, supra note 55, at 4.
See Blair & Pollman, supra note 33, at 1733 (“The derivative nature of rights for corporations
requires the Court to pay attention to distinctions, to explicitly acknowledge that, for some
purposes, some corporations can usefully and functionally be regarded as aggregates of their
members from whom rights could be derived, while other corporations serve other purposes, and
cannot be regarded as representing any particular natural person or group of natural persons.”).
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Amendment protects “persons.” A corporation is not a “person” within the
original public meaning of the word; it is an entity separate and distinct from
the natural persons composing it (nor is the word “corporation” found
anywhere within the Constitution). Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment
does not protect corporations. This ignores the argument that, even if
corporations do not equal “persons,” that the “persons” comprising the
corporation nevertheless ought to be protected derivatively in some
circumstances. Decisions employing the real entity theory thus struggle to
reconcile their textual absolutism that corporations do not equal “persons”
or “people” with the legitimate need to protect the natural persons
comprising the corporations in certain situations.
Rather than admitting that the text is vague and using principled
construction, competing theories of corporate ontology often try to
manipulate the corporate form to fit squarely within the text’s definition of
“person” or “citizen.” But as argued above, the Constitution’s text does not
fit squarely within any theory of corporate ontology. Therefore, looking to
the nature of the corporation and whether or not it is a “person” or “citizen”
as a monist method of interpreting a given constitutional provision is not a
sufficiently consistent or comprehensive means of examining the
corporation’s relationship to the text. Rather than the text constraining the
interpretation of the rule, corporate ontology theories constrain the text to fit
a view of the corporation that supports a pre-determined outcome.
III. DEFINING AND APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY
The Constitution does not refer to “corporations” or any other business
enterprises in and of themselves, nor does it explicitly make mention of purely
economic rights of individuals. Thus, the text alone does not include enough
communicative content to paint a clear enough picture to justify the grant or
denial of a given right to a corporation.71 “Gaps may be the product either
of genuine oversight by constitutional drafters or of delegation to future
political decision-makers.”72 While the Constitution clearly delineates
individual rights to “the people,” “person(s),” and “citizens,” it does not
explicitly dictate how to treat those individuals collectively when they decide
to form a corporation, nor does it anticipate the vast changes in the corporate
71

72

This can be seen as a “gap” in the Constitution’s text, as defined by Solum and Whittington. Solum,
supra note 67, at 471; Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 119, 123 (2010).
Whittington, supra note 71, at 123.
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form over the centuries since the Founding. Alternatively, one could
reasonably infer that the Framers intended to leave the determination of
corporate rights to the states, since at the time, the states had the sole purview
to regulate corporate charters.73 In this way, corporate rights can be
considered both a constitutional “oversight,” as well as a delegation to other
political decisionmakers.
This gap puts the question of which rights to grant to a corporation into
the realm of constitutional construction.74 It is therefore imperative to
examine the text and history of the Constitution pertaining to economic
rights in order to derive a principle that may be applied to corporate
constitutional rights cases. This involves two steps. First, since the initial
interpretive analysis of the “gap” of explicit constitutional provisions
pertaining to corporations proves the Constitution facially underdeterminative, this Comment will look to other areas of the Constitution
where the text implicitly or explicitly communicates principles relating to the
economic rights of individuals. This will be done in a way that both
interprets the text and constructs general principles derived from what the
text communicates. The end result of this preliminary inquiry is to discern a
principle of economic liberty. Second, this Comment will show how the
principle may be applied to the issue of when to delegate a given
constitutional right to a corporation. The goal of this two-level analysis is
not to definitively answer which rights apply to corporations. Rather, it is to
create a guiding tool in determining the nature and extent of corporate
constitutional rights that is rooted in the Constitution’s structural treatment
of economic rights.
A. Defining the Principle of Economic Liberty
In his Lochner dissent, Justice Holmes asserts that “a Constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism
and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.”75 This
kind of orthodox separation between the Constitution and economic rights
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75

See supra discussion in Part II; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”).
See Solum, supra note 67, at 475 (defining the “Construction Zone” as “[t]he set of constitutional
issues and cases for which the communicative content of the constitutional text underdetermines
legal effect, e.g., the legal content of constitutional doctrine and the resolution of constitutional
cases.”).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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has been consistently forwarded by populists and political progressives to rail
against Citizens United. Others see ample support for the proposition that the
Constitution was constructed to support and maintain a Smithian classical
political economy.76 Discerning a neutral principle of economic liberty from
the original Constitution, free of partisan economic ideology, becomes
important if we are to then consistently apply that principle to corporate
constitutional rights cases. For the purposes of this discussion, this Comment
adopts Randy Barnett’s definition of economic liberty as “the right to
acquire, use, and possess private property and the right to enter into private
contracts of one’s choosing.”77 The following discussion explores the scope
of the Constitution’s treatment of economic liberty.
1. Property
The Constitution’s protection of the right to private property is an
important facet of the document’s broader treatment of liberties that we may
consider “economic.”78 Property rights in the United States ultimately flow
from English property theory. John Locke revered “lives, liberties and
estates” as natural rights;79 this reverence is embraced in the Constitution’s
theory of property and is adopted in its text.80 Blackstone also saw property
as an “absolute right, inherent in every Englishman . . . which consists in the
free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control
or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”81 Beyond the natural rights
underpinnings of English property law, property ownership was seen as a key
driver of economic growth at the time of the Constitution’s enactment. In
crafting the property rights of individuals, however, the Framers had to

76

77
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79
80
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See, e.g., James W. Ely Jr., Economic Liberties and the Original Meaning of the Constitution 1 (Vand. U. L.
Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 07-17, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1018754 (arguing that “by the time of the constitutional convention
in 1787 the growing commitment to a market economy was eclipsing the older mercantilist regime
as the dominant paradigm in political culture, and that this development in turn influenced the
process of constitution drafting”).
See Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 5
(2012).
Merriam Webster’s dictionary defines the word “economic” to mean “of, relating to, or based on
the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services.” Economic, MERRIAMWEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/economic?utm_camp
aign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld (last visited Jan. 18, 2020).
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT IX, §123 (C. B. MacPherson, ed., Hackett
1980) (1690).
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (protecting against deprivation of life, liberty, and property)
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.
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balance the natural and economic rights of individuals with the government’s
interest in reasonably regulating private property.
Property rights are governed by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth82
and Fourteenth83 Amendments, as well as through the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause.84 “Persons, houses, papers, and effects” are additionally
protected by the Fourth Amendment from “unreasonable searches and
seizures.”85 The Fourteenth Amendment’s language extends that protection
to all “persons” in the United States.86 Taken collectively, the surface-level
communicative content of these clauses is relatively unambiguous. The
government may not infringe or seize upon a “person’s” private property,
without adequate legal processes entitled to the landowner, either through
“just compensation” or through “due process of law.”87
In requiring procedural protections, the text does not give any explicit
limits as to how property is to be used or alienated. It makes no distinction
between personal and economic uses of property. Using a given piece of land
to build a house or a factory, for example, does not alter the prohibition on
governmental “takings.” Omitting distinctions on use leads to the reasonable
interpretation that the Constitution is facially neutral when it comes to how
a given piece of property is used. Although the Takings Clause does not
create limits on how the government may regulate the creation and transfer
of private property, it does require the government to refrain from imposing
general legislation that treats individuals or classes of individuals
disadvantageously without due process.88 This suggests that different uses
and arrangements of property are protected from disparate treatment.
There remains some debate over whether there is an absolute right to
private property ownership, or whether owning private property is a mere
privilege subject to greater government regulation. Some have argued that
82
83
84
85
86
87

88

U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .”).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“. . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)
Ensuring that searches and seizures of one’s person and property are not “unreasonable” for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment acts as a similar limitation to government infringement on
private property. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018).
Edward L. Rubin, Does Property Have Constitutional Rights? 12 (October 10, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Property-Rights-Edw
ard-L.-Rubin.pdf.

578

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:2

the individual right to property is bolstered by the Framers’ alleged affinity
for strong property rights as inalienable natural rights. Barnett, for example,
has looked at the Ninth Amendment and various state constitutions to
extrapolate “the natural, inherent, and inalienable rights retained by the
people,” including “the rights to acquire, possess, and protect private
property . . . .”89 Stuart Bruchey similarly argues, using social and historical
data, that “the most important value of the Founding Fathers of the
American constitutional period was their belief in the necessity of securing
property rights.”90 Others see private property ownership as a mere social
instrumentality that may be regulated through the Constitution’s scheme of
a strong national government.91 One can, for example, point to the
government’s constitutional power to enact general legislation that deprives
individuals from their property without compensation in certain
circumstances as evidence of the Framers’ rejection of an unfettered right to
property ownership.92
Natural rights constructions of inherent property rights that reach
beyond the enacted property clauses in the Constitution’s text are ultimately
superfluous to discerning the scope of the property clauses themselves. By
placing “property” on the same plane as “life” and “liberty,” and
implementing procedural steps to limit the government’s ability to infringe
on the use of such property without due process, property rights are
undeniably essential to the Bill of Rights’ framework. Although it is
debatable as to whether there is a fundamental right to own private property
(as opposed to a mere aspiration or guiding value embraced by the Framers),
preventing deprivation of property ought to be a right on the same plane as
protecting against the deprivation of life and liberty. Procedural protections
further allow a property owner to ensure that, once acquired, the property
may be used as the owner wishes without the threat of discriminative takings.

89
90
91

92

See Barnett, supra note 77, at 5–7.
See Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on the Legal System of the Early
American Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1136 (1980).
See generally Edward L. Rubin, The Illusion of Property as a Right and its Reality as an Imperfect Alternative,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 573 (2013) (arguing that the right to own property as “not a right, but a social
instrumentality” for governance and increasing wealth).
See id. at 603 (pointing to the public use doctrine as an example of how the Constitution limits
property rights under the Due Process Clause by explicitly subject private property to governmental
intervention).
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2. Contract
The Contract Clause reads that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”93 The Clause’s text alone does not
supply an adequate level of guidance as to who it covers, the types of
contracts to which it is applicable, or when the government is deemed to have
“impaired” the “obligation” of a contract. Due to its textual ambiguities and
the under-determinative historical record surrounding the clause, the
Contract Clause’s communicative content gives inadequate substantive
content for a sound interpretation. In light of this ambiguity, Richard
Epstein has suggested two “extremes” of interpretation of the Contract
Clause. He posits:
At one extreme, the clause could be limited to prohibiting legislation directed
to the blanket discharge of existing debts. At the other extreme, the clause
could insulate contractual relations against any and all forms of state
regulation, whether by legislature or court, including even so modest an
intervention as a statute of limitations.94

Both extremes lead to starkly different constructions for the purposes of the
principle of economic liberty.
An examination of the limited legislative history reveals that the clause
pertains to state intervention in the obligations of private contracts,
particularly those of debtors and creditors.95 There is little evidence that the
Framers contemplated the clause applying to public land grants or corporate
charters between the state and entrepreneurs.96 It was only under the Taney
Court that the Contract Clause began to expand into the realm of public
corporate charters in cases like the Charles River Bridge case. Along with
continuing to protect creditors from state debtor relief statutes,97 the Taney
Court’s Contract Clause jurisprudence allowed for more intensive state
regulation of corporations.98 The change in Contract Clause interpretation
between the Marshall Court’s Dartmouth College decision and the Taney
Court’s Charles River Bridge case aptly illustrates the distinct “private” and
93
94
95
96

97
98

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 708 (1984).
See Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 1604 (explaining that the Constitution’s Framers were “principally
concerned with state attempts to relieve debtors from their creditors.”).
Id.; see also BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 15–17
(1938). But see Epstein, supra note 94, at 721 (“Even if the text of the contract clause is ambiguous
on the question of whether the prohibition it states extends to public contracts, the theory behind
the text calls for such an extension.”).
See, e.g., Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843); Gantly’s Lessee v. Ewing, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
707 (1845).
See Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 1605.
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“public” branches of Contract Clause doctrine emerging from the era.99
However, this bifurcation of the Contract Clause does not necessarily stem
from the meaning of the original clause. As Hovenkamp notes, it is the result
of shifting economic system from a mercantilist “vested” rights system to
classical economic “substantive” rights system, and a subsequent evolution
of doctrine surrounding the state’s role in regulating business corporations.100
Examining the pre-Taney Contract Clause thus shows that its interpretation
lies toward Epstein’s first extreme, in which the contract clause provides
more limited protection for private contracts. His second extreme, in which
the clause protects from state impairment any and all substantive rights
pertaining to both state and individual contracts, seems less plausible.
Although I disagree with Epstein’s analysis of the Clause’s public/private
application, his construction of the term “obligation” better fits with the
communicative scheme of the Clause. Epstein reads the “obligation” as
embracing “the entire relationship,” rather than just the debtor’s
obligations.101 He also claims that the clause protects other kinds of contracts
than those between creditor and debtor.102 The language—“obligations of
contracts”—is too general to include only one form of obligation, namely the
debtor-creditor relationship. Although the evidence shows that debtorcreditor relations were a chief concern of the Framers, the text does not limit
its communicative content to this relationship alone. Other relationships,
could conceivably be impaired by improper state action.103
The key limiting factor of protections that the Contract Clause affords to
private contractors lies in its application to past, and not future, contracts.104
The term “obligations” in and of itself implies a pre-existing arrangement to
which two or more parties are bound. Historical studies show that the
Framers’ were concerned with state retroactive impairment of contracts as
creating a riskier environment for the investment of capital; if investor
contracts could be cancelled at whim, investors were at risk of losing their
investment.105 Applying the Contract Clause prospectively to any and all
contracts that one might enter into goes beyond this narrow purpose of the
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Id. at 1604.
Id. at 1603.
Epstein, supra note 94, at 722–23.
Id. at 721.
Id.
See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 286 (1827).
See, e.g., David Crump, The Economic Purpose of the Contract Clause, 66 SMU L. REV. 687, 689–95, 697
(2013) (tracing the history of the contract clause’s ratification to conceptualize the clause as a policy
of reassuring investors).
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clause. The Contract Clause thus gives investors protection against ex post
nullification of their investments,106 but not blanket protections for the
contracts that they will prospectively form.
In total, the Contract Clause protects private contracting, but does not
apply to any and all contracting. Reading between the lines of the clause
reveals that the extent to which it promotes economic liberty is thus more
limited than some may hope.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment has been a broad vehicle for expanding the
rights of corporations.107 However, text and history show that the
Amendment was enacted as means of promoting social and political equality,
and not as a broad expansion of substantive economic rights. This becomes
clear when viewing the Amendment in the context of the two amendments
that bookend it, the Thirteenth and Fifteenth. Taken together, the
amendments represent a common scheme reflecting the rights of recently
freed African-American slaves, granting those newly freed people—and by
virtue, all citizens—civil and political birthrights.108
So-called Substantive Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment
has been used in a number of decisions to strike down state economic
regulations.109 Endemic to Lochner Era decisions is a blanket “freedom of
contract” principle, purportedly grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Frisbie v. United States, the Court then broadly held that, “generally
speaking, among the inalienable rights of the citizen is that of the liberty of
contract.”110 The same principle was commandeered by the Court, for
example, to strike down a state economic act as a broad violation of “liberty
of contract,”111 and to strike down a wage and hour law for bakers in New
York.112
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109
110
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112

Id.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY, at ch. 10 (2005).
See, e.g., Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905);
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160 (1895).
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57 (“There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or
the right of free contract . . . .”). For a complete dissemination of the “freedom of contract”
jurisprudence during the Lochner Era, see generally David E. Bernstein, Freedom of Contract, (George
Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, No. 08-51, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1239749.
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However, the plain language of the text precludes the kind of expansion
of economic liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment that the Lochner Era
Court envisioned.113 For one, the text does not add any extra language to
distinguish it from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; it merely
extends the same protection of property to the states.114 Additionally, as with
the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment ensures that adequate processes are implemented to protect
private property ownership. The rights are inherently procedural, and not
substantive, meaning they do not entitle individuals or corporations to strike
down any law that impacts their business. In order to invoke the Clause, one
must have been deprived of property due to inadequate procedure, rather
than mere inadequate substance of the law. All of this is clear from a fairly
superficial interpretation of the text.115
An alternate source of substantive economic principles underlying the
Amendment could be found in the Equal Protection Clause, as was held in
Santa Clara.116 However, like the Due Process Clause, the goal of the
Amendment was not an economically substantive one, but one of procedural
equality. From a base interpretation, the clause (in context) merely grants
that persons will be treated with equal process but does not affirmatively
advance explicit or implicit economic principles.
Finally, the Privileges and Immunities Clause offers some hope for
economic libertarians as a justification for an expansion of economic
liberties. As Akhil Amar notes, “privileges and immunities” can refer to a
panoply of rights, including those enumerated in the original bill of rights

113
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The broad “freedom of contract” principle described here has largely waned since the New Deal
and the subsequent development of the Fourteenth Amendment’s rational-basis test. See id. (“As
New Deal liberals came to dominate the Court, even the rational basis test, applied literally, seemed
too stringent . . . . In general . . . freedom of contract is [currently] almost entirely unprotected
under modern constitutional law.”). Nevertheless, some modern scholars still cling to the “freedom
of contract” principle and advocate for its return, although this viewpoint is in no way mainstream.
See, e.g., DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT (2011) (advocating for a rebirth of the Lochner Era’s freedom of contract jurisprudence).
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV with U.S. CONST. amend V.
For further critiques of Substantive Due Process, see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (Harvard U. Press 1980) (arguing that substantive
due process is a “contradiction of terms”); Nelson Lund, Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1045, 1059 (1997) (arguing that “substantive due process is not based on the text of the
Constitution or the intentions of those who made it” and that substantive due process is an
oxymoron).
Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 409 (1886) (stating that a railroad corporation
is protected by the Equal Protection clause).
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and “other canonical legal sources.”117 John Bingham, the chief drafter of
the Fourteenth Amendment, used similar language from the original Bill of
Rights in the Privileges and Immunities Clause.118 The Clause in context
therefore entitles citizens to broad, fundamental protections that states were
not allowed to infringe upon.119 As a result, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause can arguably be seen as a codification of, inter alia, the right of citizens
to obtain and use private property and enter into contract, although this
construction is only discoverable through a historical look into the what the
text communicates.
***
The preceding examination of the original Constitution illuminates a
structural principle of economic liberty. That principle is rooted in a person’s
right to acquire, possess, and use private property and to contract with others
in a way protected from ex post impairment by a state legislature without
adequate procedural safeguards. The principle of economic liberty can be
broken into three constitutive “sub-principles”:
1.

2.

3.

The ability to alienate and use one’s private property to one’s
preferences is an essential value to our constitutional order. Private
property is thus protected through the procedural safeguards of due
process and just compensation from disparate governmental
infringement.
A person ought to be able to invest capital through private contracting,
without fear of retroactive nullification of their investment. Those
private contracts are thus protected from nullification by the Contract
Clause.
The Fourteenth Amendment expands the application of the procedural
protections of private property and contract, applying those protections
equally and neutrally to all persons. It does not otherwise expand the
substantive content of the principle of economic liberty beyond mere
codification in the Privileges and Immunities Clause.

B. Applying the Principle of Economic Liberty
Now that this Comment has outlined the Constitution’s principle of
economic liberty, it is now time to see how constitutional actors can apply
the principle in deciding whether a business corporation ought to benefit
from constitutional protection. The application of the principle yields two
prescriptive conclusions. First, because the Constitution values one’s ability

117
118
119

See AMAR, supra note 108, at 386.
See id. (“In fact, Bingham borrowed directly from the Bill itself with his language ‘No . . . shall . . .
make . . . law . . . abridging’—all words lifted directly from the First Amendment.”).
Id. at 387.
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to contract and obtain property without unjust impairment by the
government, courts should not distinguish between forms of contractual and
property arrangements. Second, business corporations ought to be granted
a constitutional protection otherwise attributable to natural persons only if
the purpose of the protection is economic liberty enhancing, in that it
enhances the organization’s free agency to obtain and hold property and
enter into contracts in the way that it sees fit. Only those rights that protect
the corporation and its members’ ability to obtain property and enter into
contracts support economic liberty. Applying the principle of economic
liberty therefore does not allow business corporations to enjoy constitutional
rights that pertain to purely political or civil rights (such as speech, religion,
and voting).120
1. Organizational Neutrality
As explained in the previous Part, the principle of economic liberty places
limits on the government’s ability to infringe upon one’s right to use property
and contract to their desired economic ends. Indeed, for the modern
entrepreneur, there are a number of different forms that a business enterprise
might take, representing an infinite amount of unique arrangements of
property ownership and contracting. The entrepreneurs may choose to
organize their business into a sole proprietorship, a limited partnership, a
limited liability company, a corporation, etc. Choosing to incorporate allows
entrepreneurs a number of advantages, including perpetual ownership of
corporate property and protection of personal assets from liability. The
corporate form also allows for the enterprise to solicit and contract with
investors in order to raise capital. If the entrepreneurs choose to incorporate,
they may further choose to keep the company closely held or release shares
for wide public ownership.
In ensuring equal procedural safeguards for property and contract
regardless of the substantive ends, the economic liberty principle suggests
that a given constitutional right should be granted if it does not favor a
particular structure for the enterprise’s property and contracting, or,
conversely, penalize the choice of a given form. In other words, the decision
of whether or not to incorporate, and the form that the corporation takes,
should neither encourage nor discourage any particular use of property and
contract. In his article, Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality, Vincent
S.J. Buccola posits that this logic—what he calls the principle of
120

See infra Part III.B.2.
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“organizational neutrality”—already underlies the scattered history of
corporate rights jurisprudence.121 Although organizational neutrality is
advanced as an empirical observation concerning the underlying logic of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the economic liberty principle justifies its
use as a positive tool of constitutional decision making.
Employing organizational neutrality eliminates the need for the Court to
look at the constituent parts of the corporation based on an ad hoc theory of
corporate ontology; such theories are unnecessary for deciding whether the
corporation’s members should be protected derivatively through the
corporation. To illustrate, imagine two business enterprises: Alpha and Beta.
Alpha is a limited partnership founded by two brothers, Tom and Dave, who
each own 50% of Alpha’s assets, including a factory where they manufacture
thimbles. Beta is a closely-held corporation also founded by two brothers,
Bob and Jim, who each own 50% of the company’s common stock. Beta also
owns a factory for manufacturing thimbles. Both factories are seized by the
government, and Alpha and Beta sue in separate cases, asserting that the
Fifth Amendment protects them from the unconstitutional taking of their
respective factories without just compensation. A judge rules in favor of
Alpha, but rules against Beta, on the theory that corporations are separate
and distinct entities from their shareholders, and therefore should not be
treated the same as the natural “person” shareholders.122 One could
alternatively imagine that the judge could employ the aggregate theory to
rule that, because Beta is just an aggregation of the property interests of its
shareholders, it should be protected by the Fifth Amendment in order to
protect those shareholders. Here, the judge’s use of corporate ontology is
dispositive of their decision.
The principle of economic liberty eliminates the need to rule on grounds
of corporate ontology. Using that principle, the judge can rule that denying
Fifth Amendment property protection to the corporation penalizes the act of
incorporation by removing the procedural protections of property
ownership. It would be against the principle if the constituent natural
persons of Beta lose those protections by virtue of the enterprise’s decision to
arrange their property and contract interests in a certain way, i.e., to
incorporate. Whether the corporation is a mere aggregation of shareholder’s
voices or an entity incapable of speech is irrelevant. Granting the right to
corporations unfairly biases the non-corporate form over the corporate form,
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(2017).
For a similar illustration, see id. at 503.
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rewarding the Alphas of the world and punishing the Betas. In this case, the
choice of organization is indeterminate; their ability to freely choose their
arrangement was what was impacted. The judge can therefore avoid some
of the constitutional missteps brought about by invoking a corporate
ontology theory by using this alternative approach.
It is worth noting that commercial speech protections under the First
Amendment123 complicate a black-and-white application of organizational
neutrality. This depends on the scope of commercial speech protection
provided by the First Amendment.124 For instance, commercial speech
advocates who believe that such speech ought to be fully protected by the
First Amendment may argue that, because incorporation would remove a
constitutional protection otherwise enjoyed by non-incorporated entities,
that organizational neutrality is violated. On the other hand, if one believes
that commercial speech ought to be entirely unprotected (or, at least not as
robustly protected) by the First Amendment, then there is no penalty to
incorporation. Whether the business is incorporated or not, its commercial
speech is granted the same level of protection.
2. Property and Contract
Aside from organizational neutrality, the principle of economic liberty
suggests that only economic rights, i.e., affecting one’s right to the free use of
property and contract, should attach to corporations in order to protect their
constituent persons. In other words, the right should only be granted to
business corporations if granting such a right serves the underlying
constitutional provision’s function of enhancing some facet of the economic
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First Amendment). According to the Court, full First Amendment protections apply to speech that
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liberty principle. Pollman advances a version of this framework in Reconceiving
Corporate Personhood, arguing persuasively that, instead of merely substituting
one metaphor of corporate ontology for the other, the Court should take a
functionalist approach in deciding whether the right is intended to support
the economic rights of a the corporation’s constituent members, namely the
property and contract interests of the shareholders.125 The principle of
economic liberty lends further support for this argument, and links Pollman’s
framework to the text and history of the Constitution’s treatment of
economic rights. Adopting such a framework would take the debate back, in
a way, to the Lochner Era, when the Court was more reticent to extend
constitutional rights to corporations that were not substantively protective of
property and contract.126
To put this idea to work, let’s go back to our illustration using nonincorporated Alpha and incorporated Beta. Again, their factories are seized
by the government, and again, they both sue in their respective business
names, invoking Fifth Amendment protection against takings without just
compensation. Alpha wins their case, and now, the same judge has to decide
Beta’s fate. Rather than having to choose between an aggregate or real entity
theory in order to conceptualize Beta’s ontology, the judge can first look to
whether the function of the Fifth Amendment right is supported by the
principle of economic liberty. If it is, the judge can then decide if granting
the right to Beta would serve that purpose. Given that the Takings Clause
protects the enjoyment and use of private property, its function is supported
by the principle of economic liberty. Granting the right to the individual
members derivatively through the corporation would serve the purpose of
the Takings Clause, because, as Pollman notes, “individuals still ultimately
hold rights with economic value related to that property.”127 Therefore, Beta
ought to enjoy the same protection as unincorporated Alpha.
Now, let us say that Alpha and Beta are looking to donate to their
preferred pro-thimble Super PACs, who plan to blast the airwaves with
advertisements supporting the pro-thimble candidate leading up to that
year’s presidential election. Tom and Dave of Alpha donate $2000 each
from their personal bank accounts, whereas Bob and Jim of Beta donate
$4000 from their corporate treasury. However, Congress has recently passed
a statute that corporations may not use money from their general treasury
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fund to finance “electioneering communications” promoting a particular
candidate, making Beta’s donation illegal. Because Alpha’s donation was
made by natural individuals, they have no issue under the statute. Beta sues,
arguing that the prohibition on spending violates their First Amendment
right to free speech.128 In their complaint, Beta argues that their corporation
is just an association of two individuals who have a right to free speech, just
like their friends over at Alpha. Rather than addressing their corporate
ontology argument, the judge can look to whether the purpose of the First
Amendment right is supported by the principle of economic liberty. He may
then rule that it does not, in that the First Amendment’s purpose is to protect
political rights, and not to serve an underlying economic liberty function, i.e.,
protecting property and contract. Granting a First Amendment protection
to Bob and Jim through Beta would not serve a purpose supported by the
principle of economic liberty. If denying the right to free speech harmed Bob
and Jim’s economic rights in any way, it would be a tangential harm at worst.
CONCLUSION
Issues surrounding corporate ontology will continue to be debated, but
as this Comment has argued, those debates rarely bring about a useful
framework for deciding the constitutional rights of business corporations.
The principle of economic liberty, constructed using the Constitution’s text
and history, can act as a guide for discerning corporate rights that replaces
the corporate ontology debate. Not only is it a more practical tool, it is also
easier to square with the Constitution’s text and history. Using the principle
of economic liberty can ultimately allow future constitutional actors to decide
corporate cases in a more consistent manner than the preceding corporate
constitutional case law has shown.
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